We focus on investor-state dispute settlement provisions contained in various, though far from all, bilateral investment treaties as a possible determinant of BIT-related effects on bilateral FDI flows. Our estimation results prove to be sensitive to the specification of these provisions as well as the inclusion of transition countries in the sample. Stricter dispute settlement provisions do not necessarily result in higher FDI inflows so that the effectiveness of BITs as a credible commitment device remains elusive.
1.

Motivation
Negotiations over an increasing number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have continued unabated even though previous empirical findings are highly ambiguous on whether host countries of foreign direct investment (FDI) gain attractiveness by granting more rights to, and offering better protection of foreign investors. Policymakers in the host countries may have scant regard for the academic literature, collected in Sauvant and Sachs (2009) and reviewed by UNCTAD (2009), berating its findings as practically irrelevant. Indeed, there was at least one plausible reason to do so: While earlier studies differ in terms of coverage and econometric approach, they typically have in common that all BITs are treated as homogenous -thus ignoring that the provisions contained in BITs often differ significantly.
In the present analysis, we take into account that some BITs are particularly strict in binding the host country's hands, whereas important provisions are completely missing in other BITs. The focus is on dispute settlement provisions. Experts agree that BITs are a particularly credible commitment device if foreign investors have direct and guaranteed access to international arbitration, where they can bring a claim against the host country for breaches of the agreement and seek monetary compensation for resulting damages (Wälde 2005; Allee and Peinhardt 2010) . This would imply that informed foreign investors cannot reasonably be expected to react in the same way to BITs with and without binding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions.
Nevertheless, it is far from obvious that ISDS provisions result in higher FDI flows. According to Poulsen (2010) , "investors very rarely inquire about BITs, and when they do it is typically when disputes have arisen and not when they plan their investments." 1 Furthermore, stricter ISDS provisions obviously involve the risk that host countries are challenged before an arbitration panel and lose disputes through international arbitration. The reputation of host countries may be eroded in this way, and FDI flows may decline as a result (Allee and Peinhardt 2009 BITs without binding arbitration are excluded from the sample.
Method and data
We follow large parts of the relevant literature and estimate a gravity-type model on the determinants of FDI, the baseline specification of which reads as follows:
where FDI ijt stands for bilateral FDI flows from country i to country j in period t, and FDI it for total FDI of country i in all (developing) countries included in our sample.
3 X jt represents a set of control At the same time, the inclusion of ISDS provisions varies across source countries of FDI. All 28 3 Negative FDI flows are set equal to zero to include as many observations as possible. 4 BITDS is equal to zero (and BIT is equal to one) if a ratified BIT contains no ISDS provisions or just "promissory" ISDS, i.e., without any pre-consent or guarantee of being able to bring a claim to international arbitration. As detailed below, we apply alternative definitions of BITDS to check the robustness of our results. 5 We are most grateful to Jason Webb Yackee for sharing his coding of ISDS in BITs with us.
sample BITs involving the United States in 2002 had strong ISDS provisions, in striking contrast to many BITs involving Germany and Switzerland which only started to include ISDS with comprehensive pre-consent from the 1990s.
We employ a fairly standard set of controlling variables. We include total real host country GDP and real GDP Growth, host country Inflation, host country Openness to trade, and the difference in GDP per capita between the source and the host country (DiffGDPpc). Moreover, we incorporate dummies for the existence of a bilateral or regional trade agreement (RTA), a double taxation treaty (DTT), and a common currency (ComCur). We expect a positive association of GDP, Growth, DiffGDPpc, RTA, DTT, and ComCur with FDI; the opposite applies to Inflation as our proxy for macroeconomic distortions. PolCon reflects political constraints on the executive branch and is included as a controlling variable as poor institutions may discourage FDI by giving rise to uncertainty.
6
We take the natural logarithm of FDI, GDP, DiffGDPpc, and Inflation to reduce the skewness in the data. To keep the zero and negative observations, we use the following logarithmic transformation: We apply different estimation techniques in line with Busse et al. (2010) . For a start, we ignore the potential endogeneity of BIT and BITDS and estimate a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) fixedeffects model. We then estimate a fixed-effects Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 6 See Appendices A and B for definitions and sources as well as summary statistics. 7 See Appendices C and D for the lists of source and host countries. model to account for the fact that the sample includes a large number of zero observations. Finally, we account for possible endogeneity by employing a dynamic Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator, i.e., the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) .
Results
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 , we enter BITs independently of whether they include effective ISDS provisions. Using the largest possible sample in column (1) reproduces the significantly positive effects of BITs on bilateral FDI flows found in Busse et al. (2010) . 8 The coefficients of most controlling variables are statistically significant with the expected signs. In particular, we find significant evidence for both horizontal (GDP) and vertical FDI (DiffGDPpc). In addition to BITs, trade agreements (RTA) and tax treaties (DTT) stimulate FDI, whereas higher country risk (i.e., low values of PolCon) and macroeconomic instability (Inflation) discourage FDI. The results for the controlling variables are hardly affected when replicating the estimation for the smaller sample of source countries for which we have information on ISDS provisions (column 2). Most importantly, the BIT variable remains significant with a just slightly smaller coefficient.
Turning to dispute settlement as the variable of principal interest, the results shown in column (3) suggest that any positive effect of BITs on FDI can be attributed to ISDS provisions. BITs without such provisions prove to be ineffective at conventional levels of significance, whereas BITs with Before offering an explanation for these surprising findings, we show that the same ambiguity persists when running PPML estimations instead of OLS. The results reported in columns (5) - (8) of Table 1 are exactly as before for all BIT-related variables. In particular, it is only when ISDS is defined to include both partial and full pre-consent that bilateral FDI flows are positively affected in a significant way. Furthermore, the same results are achieved in Table 2 where we report the system GMM estimations accounting for possible endogeneity of BIT-related and other explanatory variables. 9 The GMM estimations reveal that bilateral FDI flows are strongly path dependent.
Nonetheless, the results on BITs with and without ISDS provisions are essentially unchanged.
Focussing on our preferred GMM estimations, we assess the importance of sample selection for the sensitivity of results on BIT-related variables. Inspecting the data on the strength of ISDS provisions reveals that pre-consent is only partial in most BITs involving some transition countries By contrast, our results depend significantly on whether the above listed transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe are included in the sample. As shown in columns (5)- (8) of Table 2, all BIT-related variables turn completely insignificant once these countries are excluded. Note that this even applies to the estimations in which ISDS provisions are not accounted for (columns 5 and 6).
The latter result resembles previous findings of Busse et al. (2010) , according to whom the positive effects of the mere existence of BITs on FDI flows weaken drastically once transition countries are excluded. The reason may be that BITs were an effective means to attract FDI to transition countries that lacked any reputation concerning the credibility of unilateral FDI-related measures immediately after the regime change. In contrast to Poulsen (2010) Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects; t-values, reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity; due to space constraints, the coefficients for the year dummies are not shown; likewise, source-year effects are always included but not displayed; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
